We study the persuasive e ects of political advertising. Our empirical strategy exploits FCC regulations that result in plausibly exogenous variation in the number of impressions across the borders of neighboring counties. Applying this approach to detailed data on television advertisement broadcasts and viewership patterns during the 2004{12 presidential campaigns, our results indicate that total political advertising has almost no impact on aggregate turnout. By contrast, we nd a positive and economically meaningful e ect of advertising on candidates' vote shares. Taken at face value, our estimates imply that a standard deviation increase in the partisan di erence in advertising raises the partisan di erence in vote shares by about 0.5 percentage points. Evidence from a regression discontinuity design suggests that advertising a ects election results by altering the partisan composition of the electorate.
Introduction
The advent of television has had a profound impact on how politicians communicate with their constituents. While Harry S. Truman traveled over thirty thousand miles and shook over half a million hands during the 1948 presidential campaign, only four years later, Dwight D. Eisenhower leveraged the power of TV advertisements to reach a far greater audience at substantially lower cost. Today, political advertising is the primary method by which candidates reach out to voters in the United States. Leading up to the presidential election in 2012, candidates and their supporters aired more than 1.1 million TV ads (Wesleyan Media Project 2012; Washington Post 2012) . Even during the preceding o -year congressional election, TV advertising accounted for between 40% and 50% of campaigns' budgets (Ridout et al. 2012 ).
Social scientists have long been interested in the consequences of political mass communication. Fearing that voters may be easily manipulated by self-interested agents, some equate persuasion with propaganda (e.g., Herman and Chomsky 1988; Lippmann 1922 ). Others note that even self-serving messages may further the democratic process by providing citizens with potentially valuable information about candidates and their competitors (see, for example, Bernays 1928 and Downs 1957) . Despite the longstanding scholarly interest and the ubiquity of political advertising in modern democracies, our understanding of its e ects remains incomplete.
A small well-identi ed literature documents large electoral e ects in consolidating democracies (Da Silveira and De Mello 2011; Durante and Gutierrez 2014; Larreguy et al. 2017) . As pointed out by Larreguy et al. (2017) , however, political advertising in mature democracies is typically thought to have only a negligible impact. Commercials appear to be ine ective at engaging the electorate (Ashworth and Clinton 2007; Krasno and Green 2008) , and their impact on individuals' opinions is extremely short-lived (Gerber et al. 2011 ). Taken at face value, these ndings contradict campaigns' choices. Why allocate close to half of all available funds to a mode of campaigning that promises only minimal results?
In this paper, we reexamine the impact of political advertising on elections in the United States. Our ndings are at odds with the conventional wisdom of minimal e ects. While we do con rm previous null results with respect to turnout, we present evidence of a positive and economically meaningful impact of advertising on candidates' vote shares.
To estimate the causal e ect of political advertising, we build on work by Toniatti (2014) and Shapiro (2018) . Speci cally, we exploit Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations that result in plausibly exogenous variation in the number of advertisements across county borders. The FCC grants media companies local broadcast rights for a set of counties called a demographic market area (DMA) or media market. Candidates, in turn, determine television-advertising strategies at the DMA level. By comparing neighboring counties that are in the same state but assigned to di erent media markets, our approach relies on thousands of regulation-induced discontinuities in the advertising exposure of constituents.
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In the political domain, nearly all ads are purchased at the DMA level (Goldstein and Freedman 2002 ). Yet, on average, a set of border counties constitutes only about 5% of markets' combined population. Since ad prices as well as campaigns' strategies are likely determined by aggregate, market-level factors, one would expect that a particular border county exerts only minimal in uence on the decision of how much air time to buy in a given DMA. If correct, then di erences in advertising intensity across neighboring counties that are assigned to di erent DMAs should be as good as random, especially after conditioning on counties' time-invariant features. As a partial test of this assumption, we show that observables explain only a trivial amount of the variation in advertising intensity across neighboring border counties. An F -test fails to reject the null hypothesis that electorates' observable characteristics are jointly uncorrelated with di erent measures of political advertising, with p-values ranging from 0:349 to 0:655.
We apply our identi cation strategy to uniquely detailed data for the 2004, 2008 , and 2012 presidential elections. Instead of imputing viewership from self-reported media consumption or noisy cost estimates, we derive measures of how often each political ad was actually seen by using information on ad broadcasts combined with viewership data provided by The Nielsen Company. To evaluate existing claims about political advertising's impact on voter engagement, we study aggregate turnout as well as vote shares. While na• ve estimates suggest that advertising plays an important role in mobilizing the electorate, our within-border pair results imply that the positive correlation between the number of advertisements and overall turnout is spurious. Our results are robust with respect to an array of di erent speci cations, including alternative measures of advertising intensity and di erent time windows before the election.
After demonstrating that our empirical approach has the potential to detect spurious relationships in the raw data, we explore the impact of political advertising on actual votes. In stark contrast to the results with respect to aggregate turnout, we nd that advertising has a nontrivial impact on candidates' vote shares. According to our estimates, a standard deviation increase in the partisan di erence in advertising, i.e., the average citizen seeing about twenty-two more ads promoting one candidate rather than the other, increases the partisan di erence in vote shares by about half a percentage point.
We study the mechanisms behind this e ect in a supplemental analysis relying on o cial turnout histories for millions of registered U.S. voters. To gauge the contribution of compositional changes of the electorate (i.e., the extensive margin) relative to e ects on individuals' preferences and opinions (i.e., the intensive margin), we implement a regression discontinuity (RD) design that compares partisans who live nearby but on opposite sides of media market borders. Our RD evidence suggests that partisan di erences in turnout depend on partisan di erences in political advertising. The size of the RD estimates implies that compositional changes can explain much of the e ect of advertising on vote shares. Although political advertising does not appear to lead to universally higher voter engagement, it alters the partisan composition of voters, which, in turn, a ects election results.
Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a large body of work on the consequences of political mass communication (see, e.g., Zaller 1992) . While the minimal e ects thesis of Klapper (1960) dominated the literature until the late 1980s, more recent scholarship often reaches di erent, contradictory conclusions. Some, for instance, argue that political advertising enlarges the electorate by informing and engaging citizens (e.g., Freedman et al. 2004) . Others, however, contend that the increasing use of negative advertisements hurts the democratic process, as it turns voters away from the polls (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Ansolabehere et al. 1999) . Iyengar and Simon (2000) and Geys (2006) provide reviews of this literature, \which for the most part lacks compelling strategies for identifying causal e ects" (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010, p. 650 ).
There are a handful of exceptions. The rst is a large, randomized controlled trial by Gerber et al. (2011) . Eleven months before the 2006 gubernatorial election in Texas, the authors randomly assigned the timing of an ad campaign across 18 media markets. Relying on a panel of opinion surveys, the evidence indicates a sizeable but eeting impact on constituents' attitudes. Within one to two weeks, the campaign's e ect had all but vanished. Ultimately, our research design and results complement those of Gerber et al. (2011) . Although we lack true randomization, we are able to study real-world election outcomes as opposed to self-declared attitudes and opinions. Moreover, we explore the e ects of campaign advertising in a competitive environment, where average spending per media market is more than an order of magnitude higher than in the experiment of Gerber et al. (2011) . Importantly, the results in this paper suggest that much of advertising's impact on vote shares is due to changes in the partisan composition of the electorate. This may explain why campaigns advertise so much|often months before the election|despite short-lived e ects on individuals' opinions.
Another exception is a recent eld experiment by Kendall et al. (2015) , who collaborated with an Italian mayor to send voters randomized messages. Relative to the control group, voters who received campaign messages about the mayor's valence updated their beliefs and increased their support by about 4:1 percentage points. The e ect was smaller when the message was delivered via mass mailings rather than by phone, or when it contained information about the mayor's ideology instead. Like Kendall et al. (2015) , we study actual vote shares. Motivated by the U.S. experience, however, we focus on television commercials and their quantity rather than on how voters update beliefs when presented with di erent information.
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In addition, we contribute to rapidly growing literatures on the political economy of mass media and persuasion (see Prat and Str• omberg 2013 and DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010 for reviews) . DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) demonstrate that the addition of Fox News to local cable networks increased Republican presidential vote shares by about half a percentage point, implying a persuasion rate of f = 11:6.
3 In a similar vein, Enikolopov et al. (2011) estimate that Russian voters with access to an independent TV station were signi cantly more likely to vote for opposition parties (f = 7:7). In the U.S. context, Gentzkow (2006) shows that the introduction of television itself reduced voter turnout in congressional elections by about two percentage points per decade (f = 4:4), while Gentzkow et al. (2011) nd that, historically, availability of at least one newspaper per county increased turnout by one percentage point (f = 12:8).
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With persuasion rates between 0:01 and 1:1, our estimates of advertising's e ectiveness are only a fraction of those in existing work. This is not surprising. Seeing a few dozen thirtysecond political ads constitutes an arguably less intense treatment than having year-round access to newspapers or an additional TV station. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective the e ect of partisan advertising ought to be smaller than that of (slanted) news, at least if journalists are less biased than campaigns (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Knight and Chiang 2011) . Beyond estimating the e ects of political advertising on electoral outcomes, we contribute to this literature by shedding light on the channels through which the persuasive e ects of the media operate.
2 Another strand of the literature uses structural techniques to estimate the impact of political advertising. Gordon and Hartmann (2013) argue that advertising increases aggregate turnout as well as the respective candidate's vote share. Martin (2014) concludes that these e ects operate primarily by \persuading" rather than \informing" constituents.
3 The persuasion rate should be interpreted as the percentage of individuals who change their behavior in response to receiving a particular message (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007) . 4 Other important contributions include Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) on measuring media bias, Durante and Knight (2012) on partisan control of the media, Str• omberg (2004) on radio's impact on public spending, Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009) on media and Hispanic-voter turnout, and Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) on media bias and polarization.
Regarding political advertisements as signals sent by a biased source, the results in this paper also speak to the question of whether such messages can persuade receivers, or whether they will necessarily be perceived as cheap talk (see, e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Knight and Chiang 2011) . Prat (2002) shows that a ban on campaign advertising may improve welfare, even if voters are perfectly rational. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) consider the impact of competition on information provision. They demonstrate that competition between di erent senders may increase or decrease the amount of information that is revealed in equilibrium. Our ndings indicate that voters do react to biased messages from di erent senders. Moreover, in an appendix we provide suggestive evidence of approximately constant returns to scale in the number of messages that voters receive.
Media Markets and Political Advertising in the United States
When Dwight D. Eisenhower advertised in the 1952 presidential election, almost all viewers received the broadcast signal through over-the-air antennae.
5 Whether an advertisement reached a particular household depended on the strength of the station's signal, the local terrain, and the quality of the household's antenna. The increasing popularity of cable television over the next three decades removed these technological barriers and gave viewers access to the content of any station o ered by their cable provider. In response to cable companies' increasing market power, U.S. Congress and the FCC implemented a series of policies to protect local TV stations. In particular, the 1992 Cable Act included a \must-carry" provision that required cable providers to include local broadcast stations.
In order to implement the regulation and to determine which local stations corresponded to a particular cable subscriber, the FCC adopted Nielsen's de nition of media markets. According to Nielsen's classi cation system, U.S. counties are uniquely assigned to a DMA based on historical viewing patterns.
6 DMAs are usually centered around the largest metropolitan area in the region. For example, the Philadelphia DMA includes eight surrounding counties in Pennsylvania, eight counties in New Jersey, and two in Delaware. Any cable provider serving a customer in one of these eighteen counties is required to include local Philadelphia broadcast stations in the customer's cable package.
Similar provisions apply to satellite TV providers. If a satellite provider chooses to o er any of an area's local stations, such as an a liate of the major TV networks, then the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1998 requires it to carry all of them. By 2010, more than 90% of households subscribed to either cable or satellite TV (Nielsen 2011 ).
Importantly for our purposes, local broadcast television is the primary method that po-5 A mere seventy communities had access to cable television in 1950 (FCC 2012) . 6 Only seven counties are assigned to multiple DMAs. These counties are excluded from the analysis.
litical candidates use to reach voters. Out of a total of $2.6 billion in political advertising expenditures leading up to the 2008 general election, approximately $2 billion was directed at broadcast television, compared to only $200 million for national cable networks, about $400 million for radio, and less than $25 million for digital media (Borrell Associates 2015; New York Times 2008) . Even in 2012, when, according to Zac Mo at, Digital Director of Mitt Romney for President, voter engagement via platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube constituted the biggest change relative to prior years, online advertising accounted for less than 15% of the paid media budget of the presidential campaigns (Scola 2012; Wall Street Journal 2015) . TV ads placed through local broadcast networks attract the lion's share of funds because they reach a large number of potential voters in key geographic areas. The coarseness of Nielsen's DMA de nitions, however, limits candidates' ability to engage in further location-based targeting. As a consequence, campaigns typically determine their TV advertising strategies at the DMA level (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Ridout 2007) .
Journalistic accounts suggest that political campaigning has undergone an analytics revolution over the last few election cycles. Its most profound impact, however, has been on campaigns' ground operations and digital outreach. Based on the description of one Obamacampaign insider, prior to 2012, TV ad buys were decided by \guys sitting in a back room smoking cigars, saying`We always buy 60 Minutes'" (Scherer 2012) . Only in 2012 did campaigns start to use big data to better target their TV advertisements (Fowler et al. 2016; Issenberg 2013) . Internal estimates of the Obama campaign suggest that these optimization e orts resulted in e ciency gains of about 14% relative to 2008 (Scherer 2012) . If correct, then improvements in targeting did yield nontrivial cost savings. Yet, relative to the uncertainty inherent in statistical estimates of advertising's e ectiveness, an improvement of 14% appears to be rather modest|about the same size as the standard errors on our main result.
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Nonetheless, targeted campaign activities that are correlated with ad buys on local broadcast TV pose a threat to our identi cation strategy. In the appendix, we address this potential issue in two complementary ways. First, we disaggregate our results by election year. Because the targeting of advertisements was still in its infancy in 2004 and 2008, we can assess 7 To understand why improvements in targeting are likely of minor consequence for estimates of advertising's e ectiveness, let f denote the persuasion rate and let p be the share of persuadable viewers, i.e., the share of viewers who may change their behavior in response to seeing a particular spot. Advertising's impact is given by y = f p + 0(1 p) = f p. According to Scherer (2012) , big data enabled the Obama 2012 campaign to select programs viewed by a greater number of persuadable voters, e.g., \Miami-Dade women under 35." If the campaign reached, on average, 14% more persuadable voters per ad, then, absent simultaneous improvements in f , y also increased by 14% relative to 2008|a modest improvement compared to the standard errors below. We are unaware of anecdotal evidence to suggest that campaigns have also become better at producing more persuasive spots.
whether our estimates are sensitive to this change in technology. Second, we present results that di erentiate between battleground and non-battleground states. This is useful because resource constraints force presidential candidates to focus their e orts on swing states. The fact that our estimates for non-battleground states, where campaigns have no meaningful ground game, line up with those for competitive states suggests that unobserved, targeted voter-mobilization activities are not a rst-order concern.
Data and Econometric Strategy

Econometric Approach
As explained above, we exploit the coarseness of Nielsen's DMA classi cations to estimate the electoral impact of political advertising. At its core, the empirical strategy in this paper builds on a large literature in labor economics, which uses spatial policy discontinuities to estimate the economic e ects of state-wide minimum wages (see Card and Krueger 1994; Dube et al. 2010) , right-to-work laws (Holmes 1998) , and school-zoning regulations (e.g., Black 1999). Our approach is also closely related to several papers that rely on media market de nitions to explore the importance of mass media for the political economy (see Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Campbell et al. 1984; Niemi et al. 1986; Snyder and Str• omberg 2010) .
8 Shapiro (2018) uses essentially the same identi cation strategy to estimate a structural model of demand spillovers from pharmaceutical advertising.
For an intuitive illustration of our approach, consider Figure 1 , which displays counties and DMAs in the state of Illinois. Illinois has 102 counties served by 10 media markets. We de ne a \border-county pair" as two neighboring counties that are assigned to di erent DMAs. In order to ensure that our results are not contaminated by comparisons across potentially very di erent state-level electoral environments (say, due to states' varying competitiveness), we restrict attention to border-county pairs in which both counties belong to the same state.
For example, we examine Fayette and Shelby Counties (highlighted in Figure 1 ). Both are quite rural. As of the 2010 Census, Fayette County had roughly 22,100 inhabitants and a median household income of $41,300. Shelby County had about 22,400 residents with a median household income of $44,600. Importantly for our purposes, they straddle a media market border. Fayette County is located at the far east of the St. Louis market, whereas Shelby County is part of the Champaign-Spring eld-Decatur DMA. Being assigned to the former rather than the latter media market has signi cant consequences for voters' exposure to political advertising. Within sixty days leading up to the 2008 election, local broadcast stations in the St. Louis DMA aired thousands of presidential ads, while the ChampaignSpring eld-Decatur market registered less than twenty.
On average, border counties account for only about 5% of DMAs' combined population. Since almost all political advertising is purchased at the DMA level, one would expect that prices as well as campaigns' strategies are determined by aggregate, market-level factors, on which individual border counties have only a small in uence. If correct and if every border county has exactly one within-state neighbor, then inferring the causal impact of political advertising on outcome y is conceptually straightforward. Consider, for instance, the econometric model
where Ads c;t measures the intensity of political advertising in county c during election year t, c denotes a county xed e ect, p;t marks a year-speci c xed e ect for border-county pair p, and X c;t is a comprehensive vector of time-varying controls. The coe cient of interest is , which is identi ed by comparing deviations from the mean in one county to deviations from the respective mean in the neighboring county. Intuitively, identi cation in our approach comes from thousands of local discontinuities created by FCC regulations. In total, our data contain 5,924 of these county-level natural experiments.
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Complications arise when border counties have multiple neighbors that are located in other DMAs. For instance, as shown in Figure 1 Fayette County forms a within-state bordercounty pair not only with Shelby, but also with E ngham County. As a consequence, the total number of border-county pairs exceeds the number of border counties, which precludes us from directly estimating the border-pair xed e ect. We resolve this issue by stacking observations so that a particular county appears in our sample exactly as many times as it can be paired with a within-state across-DMA neighbor. This allows us to treat p;t as a nuisance parameter (see Dube et al. 2010 ). Stacking does not a ect the intuition for how is identi ed.
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To allow for arbitrary patterns of serial correlation and for correlation in the residuals of counties that are geographically close, our border-pair regressions cluster standard errors by state and media market border, using the two-way clustering procedure of Cameron et al. 9 There are 2,529 natural experiments in our data for 2008 and 2012, but only 866 in that for 2004. As explained in Section 4.2, this di erence arises because the 2004 data cover only the 100 largest media markets.
10 Another possibility that does not involve stacking would be to replace the border-county pair xed e ect with one for the DMA-border segment, i.e., the entire border between two media markets. This, however, comes at the cost of comparing counties that are further apart from each other, and thus likely less similar on unobservables. Nevertheless, both approaches yield qualitatively similar results (see Spenkuch and Toniatti 2016) .
(2011). Clustering also corrects for the correlation that is introduced by stacking.
Data Sources
We apply this estimation strategy to uniquely detailed data on the intensity of political advertising during the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential campaigns. Information on the broadcast of political advertisements is available through a cooperation between the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG) and the Wesleyan Media and Wisconsin Advertising Projects (Fowler et al. 2015; Goldstein et al. 2011; Goldstein and Rivlin 2007) . According to CMAG, the data form a complete record of all political ads that aired on any of the national television or cable networks.
11 In 2004, the 100 largest media markets, or about 86% of the U.S. population, are covered. For 2008-12, coverage was expanded to all 210 DMAs. The CMAG data include timestamps for each ad, the sponsoring group (i.e., a candidate's campaign, the national party, independent interest groups, such as PACs, etc.), the candidate it supported, as well as more detailed, human-coded information on its content.
As political advertisements air at all times of the day and during di erent programs, the total number of ads that are broadcast in a particular market makes for a questionable measure of advertising intensity, i.e., the number of ads that people actually saw. To directly gauge constituents' exposure to political advertising, we use detailed viewership information provided by The Nielsen Company. Nielsen is the market leader in television-audience measurement. At the heart of Nielsen's e orts is a proprietary technology that tracks the media consumption of a representative cross section of households. Relying on metering devices installed in about 30,000 households, Nielsen monitors which channel is being watched at any particular point in time on all TVs in the home. In addition, each year the company collects approximately 2 million week-long TV diaries. These data then form the basis of the so-called Nielsen ratings, which are available by gender and age group for each DMA.
We measure advertising intensity in impressions per capita among voting-aged adults. An impression is de ned as one viewer being exposed to one commercial. Our metric of advertising intensity thus corresponds to the number of ads seen by the average adult in a particular DMA. Given that CMAG and Nielsen time stamps do not perfectly match, we average the Nielsen-reported number of impressions (among all viewers age 18 and older) over thirty-minute intervals, and assign the corresponding value to the particular instance in which an ad aired. To assess aggregate presidential advertising, we focus on a 60-day time window leading up to the election and, for each market, sum impressions over all local broadcasts of all presidential ads, including those sponsored by the national parties and other interest groups.
12 In symbols, aggregate presidential advertising in media market d during year t is de ned as Ads d;t
where k indexes candidates, and S k;d;t denotes the total number of spots in support of candidate k that aired in that market within 60 days before the election.
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We measure partisan advertising in the same way, except that we sum only over ads that support a particular candidate|either through positive messaging related to the candidate or through negative messaging directed at his opponent. Since Nielsen ratings are only available at the DMA level, we assign the same advertising measures to all counties within a given market. If viewing habits in border counties di er from those in the remainder of the media market, then our advertising variable is likely to contain measurement error, which would bias our estimates towards zero. Yet, we believe that the Nielsen data constitute the best available source of information on how many potential voters viewed a particular spot.
14 County-level information on the total number of voters, votes for each presidential candidate, write-ins, etc., come from the CQ Voting and Elections Collection (Congressional Quarterly 2015). To calculate voter turnout, we combine these data with population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau. All individuals age 18 and older are considered potential voters. While this broad categorization includes some who are ineligible to vote (e.g., felons and non-U.S. citizens), it has the advantage of being robust to endogenous voter registration.
To obtain information on the observable characteristics of counties' residents, we turn to the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To measure election coverage by the local press, we count the number of election-related articles in the Factiva database, weighted by the respective newspapers' circulation in a particular county. In addition, we use the slant index of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) to proxy for newspapers' political leanings. Data on candidate appearances by media market come from Shaw (2007) , Huang and Shaw (2009) , and FairVote.org. For more detailed information on the data as well as precise de nitions of all variables used throughout the analysis, see the Data Appendix.
Descriptive Statistics & Tests of the Identifying Assumption
Combining all di erent sources, Table 1 displays summary statistics for our county-level data set, by border-pair status. There is considerable variation in advertising intensity. The average county in our data records 71 impressions per capita. In some areas, however, votingaged adults see over 450 spots, whereas other counties have virtually no presidential ads on TV. Variation with respect to turnout and vote shares is also quite large. Table 1 further shows that border counties are not perfectly representative of the United States as a whole. Although turnout is broadly comparable across border and non-border counties, the former are less populous and have lower median incomes. More important for our purposes is whether, conditional on constituent characteristics, advertising intensity is truly as good as random across media market borders. If so, then the estimates below recover a local treatment e ect. That is, we estimate the impact of political advertising on voters who viewed a given number of ads only because they lived on either side of a DMA border.
Unfortunately, our identifying assumption that di erences in advertising intensity are uncorrelated with di erences in time-varying unobservables is fundamentally untestable. One may be willing to judge its plausibility, however, by asking whether di erences in observables predict di erences in advertising. A correlation between political advertising and border counties' time-varying observable characteristics would raise concern about a similar correlation with unobservables. Table 2 provides suggestive evidence that this concern is not warranted. The results therein are based on the estimator in equation (1), using di erent measures of political advertising as outcomes. For ease of interpretation, all variables have been standardized, so that the coe cients refer to the standard deviation change in advertising resulting from a standard deviation increase in the regressor.
Regardless of which advertising measure we consider, few of the point estimates in Table 2 are economically large or statistically signi cant. In fact, for each speci cation a joint F -test is unable to reject the null hypothesis that all coe cients are exactly equal to zero, with pvalues ranging from 0:349 to 0:655. Remarkably, observable characteristics explain less than 1% of the within-variation in the respective measure of advertising intensity.
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For a subset of thirty-one media markets we have also been able to obtain transcripts of televised news shows ahead of the 2008 election. In Appendix B, we rely on these transcripts to measure election coverage by local TV stations. Reassuringly, di erences in news coverage do not predict di erences in political advertising. Moreover, Appendix D presents placebo tests asking whether future advertising \a ects" current election results. It does not. Of the 81 point estimates in Appendix Table A .7, only four are statistically signi cant, most of which have the \wrong" sign.
Our interpretation of these results is that di erences in political advertising between border counties are essentially random. We hasten to add, however, that it is impossible to de nitively prove the validity of our identifying assumption.
Political Advertising and Election Results: Empirical Evidence
Political Advertising and Turnout
We now explore the e ect of total political advertising on voter turnout. Pooling over the 2004{12 presidential elections, Table 3 presents the results, relying on our sample of stacked border-pair counties.
16 The simple OLS estimate in column (1) suggests that an additional ten impressions per capita raise voter turnout by almost 0:21 percentage points. Put di erently, a standard deviation increase in presidential advertising is associated with an increase in turnout of about 2:2 percentage points. Adding county xed e ects to control for timeinvarinat unobservables reduces the point estimate by more than a third. Yet, it remains statistically signi cant and sizeable. Based on the evidence presented so far, it would appear that political advertising leads to a nontrivial increase in voter engagement.
Column (4) implements our cross-border pair estimator in equation (1). Remarkably, comparing only neighboring counties reduces the coe cient on total advertising to near zero. The sharp reduction in the point estimate between columns (2) and (4) suggests that campaigns advertise more in areas and years in which citizens are more likely to vote anyway. Since counties that are geographically close tend to experience similar shocks, our border-pair estimator is able to account for this confound, while more na• ve approaches cannot.
Column (5) additionally controls for all time-varying covariates shown in Table 2 , all nonpresidential political advertising as well as candidate visits as a proxy for campaigns' ground operations. The last column in Table 3 controls for the lagged dependent variable in lieu of county xed e ects. This speci cation may be more appropriate if campaigns directly base their advertising decisions on the outcome of the last election. Moreover, the model in column (6) lets us split the data by year in order to estimate the impact of political advertising separately for each election (see Appendix D).
The results in the lower panel of Table 3 are based on the same speci cations as those in the upper one, but allow for heterogeneity in the impact of \positive" and \negative" advertising.
17 Although estimates that allow for the e ect to vary by tone are less precise, they are almost equally close to zero. All in all, there is little to no evidence to conclude that political advertising has a meaningful impact on aggregate turnout.
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In the appendix, we probe the robustness of our ndings with respect to the weighting scheme, di erent measures of advertising intensity, and various time windows before the election (cf. Table A.9). We also investigate how the results vary across years. Broadly summarizing, our robustness checks produce estimates that tend to be close to zero and statistically insigni cant. In particular, we obtain almost identical results when we reweight border-pair counties by the inverse number of times that they appear in our stacked data set. Our results are also qualitatively robust to restricting attention to border-pairs that contain less than 5%, or even 2%, of the respective DMAs' combined population. We nd this reassuring, as our identifying assumption is most plausible in cases where border counties are highly unlikely to a ect campaigns' decisions.
Further, our point estimates remain nearly una ected when we focus on county pairs that are (almost) entirely contained within the same congressional districts, and we nd similar e ect sizes in battleground and non-battleground states. In the former, campaigns' unobserved ground operations may pose a serious threat to our identi cation strategy. The latter set of states, however, remains typically untreated, as nite resources force campaigns to focus their mobilization e orts. Observing qualitatively similar e ects in both sets of states suggests that campaigns' ground operations are likely not a signi cant confounder.
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A remaining worry is measurement error in advertising intensity. Although our measure of advertising is likely more precise than any in the literature, we cannot rule out that viewing habits in border counties di er from the respective market average, or that a nontrivial number of border-county households receive their television signal from the \wrong" DMA. In 2010, for instance, about 9:5% of U.S. households relied on terrestrial antennae for their television programming (Nielsen 2011) . If a nontrivial number of households watches TV stations from a neighboring DMA, then our advertising measure overstates the true di erence in treatment intensity, leading to estimates that are biased toward zero.
Under some assumptions, however, it is possible to gauge the severity of the bias. Suppose 17 All evaluations of advertisements' tone are due to human coders of the Wesleyan Media and Wisconsin Advertising Projects. See Freedman and Goldstein (1999) for a detailed description of the coding process.
18 A clear limitation of our approach is that the estimator in equation (1) imposes constant marginal e ects. Although we nd that this is a reasonable assumption given the range of our data (see Appendix C), we cannot completely rule out potentially nontrivial macro e ects of advertising on turnout.
19 Also, if local campaigning increases turnout, and if campaigning is positively correlated with advertising intensity, then our estimates of the impact of political ads on turnout should be upward biased. The fact that the results are close to zero is consistent with the view that local campaigning does not systematically vary across media market borders within the same state.
that a fraction of q randomly chosen households receive their television signal from the neighboring DMA. If these households were to exclusively watch programs originating in the \wrong" market, then the actual, unattenuated e ect of political advertising would equal
where b denotes the original estimate. 20 To get a sense of reasonable values for q, consider the case in which border-county households have the same propensity to rely on antenna TV as the national average, and further assume that one in two antenna households obtain their television signal from the \wrong" DMA. In such a case, q 0:05 and 1:1 b . Even if households in border counties were twice as likely as the national average to watch antenna TV, and if every single antenna household watched only programs that originated in the neighboring DMA, i.e., even if q 0:2 and 1:67 b , the true e ect of political advertising on voter turnout would still be only a fraction of the variables' correlation in the raw data. We, therefore, conclude that political advertising has at best a small impact on aggregate turnout.
This result is well aligned with Ashworth and Clinton (2007) and Krasno and Green (2008) , who argue that advertising is ine ective at engaging the electorate. The main di erence between our estimates and theirs is that ours are precise enough to rule out moderately large e ect sizes. In our preferred speci cation in column (6) of Table 3 , the 95%-con dence interval ranges from 0:004 to 0:036 percentage points. By contrast, Ashworth and Clinton (2007) estimate that having seen \many" campaign advertisements increased survey respondents' intent to vote by 0:7 percentage points, with a 95%-con dence interval of [ 15:7, 17 :1]. Krasno and Green (2008) use gross ratings points (GRPs) to measure advertising intensity. Controlling for the lagged dependent variable and state xed e ects in a cross-section of 128 DMAs, they nd that the average TV viewer seeing ten additional ads increases turnout by 0:05 percentage points. The 95%-con dence interval on their coe cient ranges from 0:06 to 0:16, which narrowly excludes the na• ve OLS estimate.
Political Advertising and Vote Shares
The evidence above suggests that our empirical approach is capable of distinguishing between true e ects and relationships that are spurious. We now use it to study advertising's impact 20 To derive (2), let turnout in border counties A and B be denoted by y A and y B , respectively, and let measured advertising be given by Ads A and Ads B . Abstracting from di erences in covariates, the estimated e ect of advertising equals b = (y A y B ) = (Ads A Ads B ). The actual amount of advertising seen by the constituents in A and B, however, is Ads A = (1 q)Ads A + qAds B and Ads B = (1 q)Ads B + qAds A . It follows that (y A y B ) = (Ads A Ads B ) = b =(1 2q).
on vote shares. Table 4 focuses on the impact of partisan di erences in advertising on di erences in vote shares. We de ne both variables so that positive values indicate an advantage of the Democratic candidate over his Republican opponent, i.e., Ads Ads D Ads R and v v D v R . As in the preceding analysis, column (1) shows a strong, positive raw correlation between dependent and independent variable. The next two sets of columns add county xed e ects as well as controls for demographics, economic conditions, candidate visits, newspaper reporting, and non-presidential advertising. This decreases the estimated correlations substantially, but does not render them meaningless.
Columns (4){(6) implement our border-county pair identi cation strategy. Comparing only neighboring counties leads to a further reduction in the coe cients. At the same time, the estimated coe cients become much more precise. Taking the point estimates in columns (4){(6) at face value, a standard deviation increase in the partisan di erence in presidential advertising|the equivalent of potential voters seeing an additional twenty-one spots for the Democratic candidate rather than the Republican one|increases the Democratic candidate's vote share by about 0:49 to 0:67 percentage points relative to that of his Republican opponent. It, therefore, appears that political advertising has a nonnegligible impact on election results, especially if one suspects that measurement error in advertising intensity attenuates the coe cients.
In Appendix D, we present results from a battery of sensitivity and robustness checks. Although the point estimates for the 2004 election are smaller than those for 2008 or 2012, the baseline estimates for these years are statistically indistinguishable from each other (p = 0:210). This is noteworthy because 2004 and 2008 predate the analytics revolution in electioneering, after which narrowly targeted campaign activities may pose a problem for our identi cation strategy. It is also reassuring that the estimated e ect of political advertising on vote shares remains qualitatively the same when we limit the sample to counties whose populations comprise less than 2% of the respective media markets, i.e., counties for which we believe our approach to be the most credible. Interestingly, there is no evidence to suggest that advertising was di erentially e ective in battleground and non-battleground states, or across states with clear partisan leanings. We do, however, nd evidence that political ads exerted greater e ects on less educated populations. Splitting our sample into counties above and below the median share of college graduates yields point estimates (standard errors) of 0:231 (0:063) and 0:436 (0:081), which are statistically distinguishable at the 5%-con dence level (cf. Appendix Table A.11).
Instrumental Variables Estimates
As a further robustness check, Tables 5 and 6 present results from an instrumental variables strategy in the spirit of Krasno and Green (2008) and Huber and Arceneaux (2007) . Given that campaigns tend to focus their resources on states in which the race is likely to be close, these authors observe that some voters are exposed to more political ads than others simply because they happen to live in a DMA that partially overlaps with a battleground state. Going back to the example in Figure 1 , Illinois voters living in the St. Louis media market saw more political ads than those in the Champaign-Spring eld-Decatur DMA at least in part because the former market also serves voters in Missouri, where the 2008 election was highly competitive. We build on this insight and combine it with our border-pair approach.
Comparing neighboring counties within the same state, Table 5 demonstrates that the share of a media market's population that is contained in a battleground state is, indeed, a strong predictor of advertising intensity. Voters in noncompetitive states see more presidential ads on TV when their own DMA overlaps to a greater extent with a battleground state than the neighboring market. Conversely, individuals in competitive states see fewer political ads when the share of non-battleground voters who reside in the same DMA is larger.
21 Importantly, advertising in support of the Democratic candidate is more responsive to DMAs' \battleground population share" than that supporting the Republican one. Leading up to the 2008 election, Barack Obama and John McCain pursued di erent strategies (see, e.g., Franz and Ridout 2010) . Not only did the former campaign advertise more than the latter, but it also put greater emphasis on highly competitive states, such as Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, and Nevada. As a consequence, our instrument is not only predictive of total presidential advertising but also of partisan di erences therein. Table 6 displays reduced form as well as two-stage least squares estimates of the impact of political advertising on turnout and vote shares. Intuitively, the identifying assumption is that di erences in the extent to which neighboring DMAs overlap with battleground states are uncorrelated with time-varying di erences in unobserved determinants of individuals' voting decisions. If this exclusion restriction is, indeed, satis ed, then the IV estimates have a causal interpretation.
Relative to their counterparts in Tables 3 and 4 , three out of the four two-stage leastsquares coe cients are larger in magnitude but also less precisely estimated. With p-values of 0:081 and 0:047 the estimated e ect on vote shares remains marginally signi cant. Based on these estimates, we continue to conclude that political advertising has no appreciable e ect on overall turnout, but skews the outcome of the election in favor of whichever candidate advertises more.
Notwithstanding the imprecision of the IV results, the estimates in Table 6 are useful for at least two reasons: (i) they correct for attenuation bias due to measurement error in advertising intensity, and (ii) they help to address an array of potential confounds. Shapiro (2018) , for instance, documents cross-media market di erences in advertising for antidepressants, and there may well be other, unobserved variables that also vary across DMA borders. For some unobserved factor to bias our IV estimates, it would not only have to a ect the election result in the respective county, but it would also have to be systematically correlated with the extent to which the remainder of the media market overlaps with battleground states. Given that DMA borders were drawn by The Nielsen Company based on historical viewing patterns, most unobserved determinants of election outcomes seem a priori unlikely to be correlated with whether or not other counties in the same DMA belong to a competitive state.
Partisan E ects
Next, we return to our workhorse empirical model and investigate heterogeneity in the effect of Democratic and Republican advertising. Table 7 presents results for vote shares that are de ned relative to the entire voting-aged population. This frees us from having to adjust for turnout when we calculate persuasion rates in Section 7. More importantly, using population-based vote shares as dependent variables allows for the theoretical possibility that one candidate's advertising has no e ect on the (absolute) support for his opponent.
Although some of the estimates in Table 7 are small and lack statistical signi cance, as a whole the evidence suggests that own advertising increases support for the respective candidate, while a rival's spots are detrimental to it. Of course, this pattern would emerge automatically had we used regular two-party vote shares as outcomes. With vote shares de ned relative to the entire voting-eligible population, however, there is no mechanical reason for the apparent symmetry in the estimates.
One plausible explanation|especially in light of our null result with respect to aggregate turnout|is that the persuasive e ects of political advertising operate primarily on the intensive margin. That is, advertising might convince those who would have gone to the polls anyway to vote for one candidate rather than the other. Another possible rationalization is that political advertising works on the extensive margin by a ecting who turns out to vote. For instance, advertising by the Democratic candidate might mobilize Democratic supporters or left-leaning moderates all the while deterring voters who would choose his Republican opponent. In the aggregate such compositional e ects might happen to o set each other, which would explain why there appears to be no meaningful impact on overall turnout.
Political Advertising and the Partisan Composition of the Electorate
Using only aggregate data there is little hope to credibly distinguish between these two explanations. In order to shed at least some light on the mechanism behind our main result, we have acquired individual-level voter-registration data for the lower forty-eight states and the District of Columbia. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 requires that all states maintain a single, computerized voter-registration list that is regularly updated by removing individuals who are deceased or ineligible, as well as duplicate entries in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The resulting lists include voters' residential address, date of registration, and turnout history.
For a subset of individuals, we also have information on date of birth, gender, and party a liation. In particular, thirty-nine states' voter-registration les have either a dedicated \party" eld, or they contain enough information to determine in which party's primary (if any) a given individual participated. We identify individuals as a \registered Democrat" or \registered Republican" if the state lists them as such, or if they voted in the respective party's primary. Voters who are not o cially a liated with any of the two major parties and did not participate in one of their primaries are classi ed as \other." 
Empirical Approach
To assess whether political advertising leads to changes in the partisan composition of the electorate, we geocode all addresses and use the information on voters' precise locations relative to DMA borders in a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Lee and Lemieux 2010; Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960) . That is, we compare turnout among registered Democrats and Republicans who live on opposite sides of media market borders. Speci cally, we are interested in whether the partisan di erence in turnout varies discontinuously at the border. In Section 6.3, we show that advertising's impact on the partisan di erence in turnout is a key parameter in assessing the importance of the compositional channel.
As above, we de ne the partisan di erence in advertising as the number of impressions per capita in support of the Democratic candidate minus that for his Republican opponent. We then say that a particular voter lives \left" (\right") of the border if partisan di erences in presidential advertising are smaller (larger) in the DMA in which she resides than in the neighboring one.
Interpreting our RD setup through the standard instrumental variables framework (Hahn et al. 2001) , we calculate the impact of partisan di erences in political advertising on partisan di erences in turnout by forming the Wald estimator:
Here, t i is an indicator for whether individual i turned out to vote, and m i denotes her distance to the nearest media market border, with negative values assigned to voters who live on the \left." Ads D and Ads R are the number of Democratic and Republican impressions per capita, respectively.
While our voter-registration data are well suited to estimate the numerator of equation (3), our advertising measure varies only at the DMA level and is, therefore, likely to overstate the true di erence in the advertising exposure of voters in the vicinity of media market borders. This is because individuals who reside close to the border may be more likely to use terrestrial antennae to watch TV stations from the \wrong" DMA. If true, then our Wald estimates are biased towards zero.
Even in the absence of this issue, it bears emphasizing that RD methods can only identify local average treatment e ects (Imbens and Angrist 1994) . That is, we estimate the impact of political advertising on the set of voters who live close to media market borders. Since identi cation comes from only a small percentage of the electorate, the results below may not generalize to the U.S. population as a whole.
At the same time, our RD strategy has at least two advantages. First, constituents' exposure to radio advertising and campaigns' ground operations is unlikely to exhibit a sharp discontinuity at within-state media market borders and, therefore, should not bias the RD estimates. Second, identi cation in our setting actually comes from di erences in discontinuities.
23 Thus, unlike traditional RD designs, our estimation strategy allows for other variables to vary discontinuously across media market borders, as long as these variables do not di erentially a ect turnout among Republicans and Democrats (see Grembi et al. 2016 for a discussion of identi cation in the DRD design).
In the appendix, we present evidence consistent with the more demanding assumption that there are no discontinuities in other, predetermined variables. Brie y, to check for irregularities in the running variable, we look at population density in the vicinity of DMA 23 To see this, rearrange the numerator of equation (3) to lim
The rst term denotes the discontinuity in turnout among Democrats, while the second one gives the discontinuity in turnout among Republicans.
borders. Based on the evidence in Figures A.11 and A.12, there is little reason to suspect that individuals in our sample are more likely to settle on one side of the border than on the other. Similarly, we nd no evidence of meaningful di erences in how long voters on either side of the border have been registered at their current address (cf. Table A.13), which helps to ameliorate concerns about selective attrition.
We also test for discontinuities in voters' age, gender, party a liation, and turnout in other elections (cf. Tables A.14{A.17). The point estimates are small, and often of varying sign. In the same vein, Table A .18 shows that partisan di erences in non-presidential political advertising do not systematically vary \left" and \right" of the DMA border. In particular, the sign of the estimated discontinuity is an order of magnitude smaller than that in Figure 2 below. Appendix Tables A.19{A .21 test for systematic di erences in newspaper circulation, local-school expenditures, and property values, none of which appear to exhibit a discontinuity. presidential elections. Another important limitation of our data is that we only observe the current address at which someone is registered. Since we cannot retrospectively ascertain individuals' place of residence, we restrict attention to cases in which a voter's registration predates the respective election. For the average individual in our sample, the straight-line distance between her residence and the nearest media market border is about 71 kilometers. Eighteen percent, however, live within 25km of a DMA border; and about two percent reside within 5km.
RD Estimates
Pooling over all partisans living within 25km of a media market border, Figures 2 and 3 depict our main RD results. Figure 2 shows raw averages for the partisan di erence in advertising within 2:5 kilometer intervals on either side of the border, i.e., the denominator in equation (3). Figure 3 does so for the numerator, the partisan di erence in turnout.
By construction, media market borders feature a large discontinuity in partisan advertis-24 Data on these outcomes come from the Alliance for Audited Media, the National Center for Education Statistics, and CoreLogic/DataQuick. See the Data Appendix for details.
25 In Wisconsin, for instance, voter registration and participation lists were maintained by municipal clerks, and municipalities with populations of 5,000 or less were exempt from such record keeping. While the state of Wisconsin does not include turnout information prior to 2006 with its o cial voter registration data, other states do. These lists provide an accurate picture of turnout in earlier election cycles only where locally maintained records were thoroughly integrated into the statewide database. In our data, turnout numbers for 2004 are often substantially lower than what would be expected based on o cial statistics.
ing.
26 On average, the size of the gap is a bit more than twenty impressions per capita. That is, voting-aged adults to the \right" of the border see about twenty additional ads favoring the Democratic candidate. Partisan di erences in turnout also exhibit a discontinuity. Registered Democrats living just to the \left" of the border are between ve and six percentage points less likely to go to the polls than their Republicans counterparts, but the gap narrows by almost two percentage points among those living just on the other side. The evidence in Figures 2 and 3 , therefore, suggests that partisan di erences in political advertising induce changes in the partisan composition of the electorate.
Based on the graphical analysis, one would conclude that an increase in the partisan di erence in advertising by ten impressions per capita raises turnout of registered Democrats by nearly one percentage point relative to their Republican counterparts. Of course, this simple analysis is subject to a number of limitations. First, there is no a priori reason for why the true functional relationship between the running variable and di erences in turnout would need to be linear. Second, Figures 2 and 3 pool over di erent natural experiments and may, therefore, be a ected by unobserved spatial heterogeneity. In what follows, we probe the results of the graphical analysis by using nonparametric techniques (Hahn et al. 2001; Porter 2003) . Table 9 presents the results. The estimates in the upper panel refer to the numerator of the Wald estimator and are based on the following \di erences in discontinuities" speci cation:
where y i;p;s;e is an indicator variable for whether voter i, who is a registered supporter of party p 2 fD; Rg and lives close to border segment s, went to the polls in election e. g l p ( ) and g r p ( ) are exibly speci ed, party-speci c polynomials of distance, which are allowed to di er on either side of the threshold. To control for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, we divide every DMA border into segments of up to 10km length and include p;s;e , a partyand election-speci c xed e ect for each of them. The parameter of interest is .
All estimates use a rectangular kernel with the respective bandwidth indicated at the top of each column. Going from left to right, the bandwidth increases from 500 meters to 5 kilometers, with the last column relying on 10-fold cross-validation for bandwidth selection (Ludwig and Miller 2005) . Successive rows use higher-order polynomials to approximate g l p ( ) and g r p ( ). 26 The fact that the average number of impressions varies across bins on either side of the border is due to di erences in the spatial distribution of voters across DMAs.
Our nonparametric estimates of range from 0:9 to 2:3 percentage points, which is roughly inline with the graphical analysis. Appendix Table A .22 decomposes the point estimates into changes in turnout among registered Democrats and Republicans. The sign pattern suggests that registered Democrats are more likely to vote|even in absolute terms|the more the Democratic candidate advertises relative to the Republican one. For registered Republicans we tend to observe the opposite e ect, though the coe cients are more variable from one speci cation to the next.
One, admittedly speculative, explanation for why political advertising may also have demobilizing e ects is that a substantial share of ads are negative. As in the experiments of Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) , attack advertising may diminish the psychological bene ts of turning out to support a particular candidate. Unfortunately, RD estimates that attempt to disentangle the e ects of positive and negative advertising are too imprecise to draw any conclusions. As a whole, however, the reduced form evidence suggests that partisan di erences in presidential advertising alter the partisan composition of the electorate.
The lower panel of Table 9 uses two-stage least squares to implement the Wald estimator.
27 To facilitate comparisons with the results in the remainder of the paper, we scale the coe cients so that they refer to the impact of 10 impressions per capita. The resulting Wald estimates range from 0:4 to 1:2 percentage points. The median coe cient is about 0:8 percentage points. 28 Based on this evidence, we conclude that political advertising has a detectable impact on the partisan composition of the electorate.
Assessing the Importance of Compositional Changes
How important are these compositional shifts? Under the assumption that registered partisans are more likely to vote for their own party's candidate than for his competitor, we can assess how much of the estimated e ect of political advertising on vote shares can be explained by changes in the partisan composition of the electorate alone.
Formally, let candidates' vote shares be given by v D and v R , and assume that, conditional on going to the polls, registered partisans vote for the candidate of their own party with probability > 0:5. With v D and v R de ned relative to the entire voting-eligible population, the following accounting identity must always hold:
Here, t p denotes turnout among supporters of party p, s p is their population share, and ! stands for the likelihood that \others" will vote for the Democratic candidate. Noting that s D s R among voters close to media market borders, we can decompose changes in the partisan di erence in vote shares into
The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (5) denotes the contribution of changes in turnout among partisans, while the second one refers to turnout of una liated individuals. The terms in the row beneath constitute the e ect of changing preferences (i.e., changes in the probability of voting for a particular party, conditional on going to the polls), while the ones in the third row refer to the interaction between shifts in both preferences and turnout.
To assess the importance of the compositional channel, suppose that political advertising has no e ect on preferences and beliefs, and that it leads to no changes in turnout among una liated voters. Equation (5) then simpli es to
Assuming that Democrats and Republicans each represent one-third of the population (i.e., s = 0:33), and relying on the range of the Wald estimates for plausible values of (t D t R ), Figure 4 plots the right-hand side of equation (6) as a function of . For comparison, in Table 7 we estimated that political advertising raises the partisan di erence in vote shares by 0:165 percentage points (horizontal line).
Naturally, as the fraction of partisans who vote for the candidate of their own party increases, di erences in turnout explain a greater proportion of the di erence in vote shares. To get a sense of plausible values for , we turn to the American National Election Survey (ANES). Among other questions, the 2008{2009 ANES Panel Study elicited respondents' vote choice in the 2008 presidential election as well as their self-declared party a liation prior to election day. Respondents could identify as \strong Republican/Democrat," \not very strong Republican/Democrat," \independent Republican/Democrat," or as truly \in-dependent." Almost 86% of those who self-identi ed as \strong" or \not very strong" Democrats later indicated that they also voted for Barack Obama. Conversely, about 92% of self-declared Republicans supported John McCain. Although self-reported votes are notoriously unreliable indicators of actual choices, the available evidence suggests that may exceed 0:8. If correct, then changes in turnout among partisans can explain most, if not all, of the estimated impact of advertising on vote shares.
Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
We have conducted an extensive set of sensitivity and robustness checks. To conserve on space, the corresponding results are presented in Appendix Tables A.25{A .29. The evidence in these tables indicates that our RD estimates are robust to controlling for voters' observable characteristics and advertising related to non-presidential races. We also obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when we restrict attention to the set of voters for whom our geocodes are the most precise, i.e., those for whom the geocoding procedure is able to locate voter's street address, or when we only compare voters on opposite sides of media market borders within the same congressional district.
To assess the impact of measurement error in advertising intensity, we turn to the FCC's Signi cantly Viewed List (FCC 2005) . In 2005, the FCC issued an updated, comprehensive assessment of all media markets in the United States. In particular, it released a list of counties where out-of-market broadcast stations have a nontrivial viewership. In Appendix Table A .29, we restrict our sample to voters who live in counties where no out-of-market station appears on the FCC's list. Consistent with the idea that measurement error introduces attenuation bias, the majority of the resulting Wald estimates are larger than their counterparts in Table 9 . At the same time, we note that the smaller sample size leads to standard errors that make any quantitative comparisons highly speculative.
Total Presidential Advertising and Turnout
So far we have restricted attention to registered partisans, as this has allowed us to assess the importance of the compositional channel. We now provide a partial test of the hypothesis that political advertising also transmits useful information.
Theoretical work that relates the quality of voters' information to turnout typically concludes that, in a given election, informed individuals are more likely to vote than the uninformed (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1999) . The intuition behind this result is that informed voters are less likely to make a mistake by choosing the ex post worse candidate. If information does, indeed, increase turnout, and if political advertising does contain new information, then we would expect that independent voters who see more political ads on TV are more likely to turn out than those who see fewer spots.
We test this hypothesis using a slight modi cation of our RD design. Instead of assigning a particular voter to either side of the DMA border according to the partisan di erence in presidential advertising, we do so based on whether total presidential advertising in her DMA exceeds that in the neighboring one. Despite a large discontinuity in total advertising (cf. Figure 5) , the Wald estimates in the upper panel of Table 10 suggest that una liated voters who are exposed to more political ads are no more likely to turn out.
For completeness, Figure 6 and the lower panel of Table 10 present results for turnout among all voters. Again, there is no evidence of a positive discontinuity at the DMA border, which implies that our previous nding of a minimal e ect of presidential advertising on overall turnout is not an artifact of using aggregate data. While we nd no evidence in favor of the idea that political advertising endows voters with useful information, we readily acknowledge that a better test would also consider actual votes.
In sum, our RD results suggest that political advertising induces changes in the partisan composition of the electorate, which o set in the aggregate. To be clear, we do not claim that changes in the partisan composition of the electorate will always exactly cancel out. However, in an environment with two candidates who have roughly the same number of supporters, and if ads have both mobilizing and demobilizing e ects, one would expect a considerably smaller net impact|especially when both campaigns advertise in similar proportions.
Discussion
To put the estimated e ect of political advertising on vote shares into perspective, we follow DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and calculate persuasion rates. Intuitively, the persuasion rate measures the percentage of individuals who changed their behavior in response to being exposed to a particular message. Given that di erent studies use di erent left-and righthand side variables, and in light of the fact that the share of individuals who are susceptible to being persuaded varies from one setting to the next, it is useful to rescale e ect sizes in this way in order to make them more comparable. Formally, the persuasion rate is de ned as
where y p = Ads p approximates the change in the outcome of interest induced by seeing additional advertisements in support of candidate p, and 1 e y p is the fraction of individuals who may be swayed by the respective candidate's message.
29
We take the outcome of interest to be the partisan di erence in vote shares de ned as a percentage of the entire voting-aged population. De ning y in this way has two advantages. First, it is not necessary to adjust for turnout. Second, we capture advertising's positive e ect on own vote shares as well as any negative impact on the support for political rivals. If the Democratic candidate, for instance, is purely o ce motivated, then he should be indi erent between one more vote for himself and one less for his Republican competitor. As a consequence, 1 e y D , the target audience for his ads, includes everybody who does not already vote for him, i.e., everybody who would either abstain or vote for his opponent.
First, we calculate the persuasion rate of one additional spot, given the observed overall level of advertising and candidates' equilibrium vote shares. To proxy for y p = Ads p , we rely on the point estimates in column (8) of Table 7 , divided by ten to account for the fact that the coe cients refer to the impact of ten impressions per capita. With the respective numbers in hand, the persuasion rate (and its standard error) is f D 0:03% (0:004%) for Democratic spots, and that for Republican advertising equals f R 0:01% ( 0:005%).
30
Next, we consider the share of potential voters who changed their behavior in response to a candidates' total advertising. To proxy for e y p in the absence of advertising by the respective candidate, we use the results in columns (2) and (5) of Table 7 and predict counterfactual vote shares. y p = Ads p is, again, given by the appropriately scaled coe cients in column (8) of the same table. The resulting persuasion rates are f D 1:1% (0:18%) and f R 0:4% (0:14%).
31
Regardless of whether we calculate the persuasion rate for a single spot or for all of a candidates' combined advertising, the respective numbers are only a fraction of the persuasion rates reported in the literature (cf. DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010). Our ndings are, therefore, consistent with the theoretical prediction that, as long as journalists are less likely to be biased than campaigns, the e ect of partisan advertising ought to be smaller than that of slanted news (e.g., Knight and Chiang 2011) . Assuming constant returns to scale, for political advertising to be similarly persuasive as being exposed to FOX News (f = 11:6) or to \alternative facts" during the 2017 French presidential election (f = 10:8, cf. Barrera et al. 2018 However, in light of the large number of viewers who see at least some political ads on TV, a more relevant metric might be advertising's aggregate impact. Within 60 days leading up to the 2008 presidential election, the average voting-aged citizen saw about 45 spots in support of Barack Obama and almost 30 ads favoring John McCain. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 206 million Americans were eligible to vote that year (File and Crissey 2012) , which, together with the numbers above, implies that political advertising a ected about 2.2 million voting decisions. Naturally, the e ects of Democratic and Republican ads will partially o set each other, resulting in a smaller net impact. Still, simply eliminating the partisan di erence in advertising by reducing the number of impressions in favor of Barack Obama to the same level as those for John McCain would have narrowed the di erence in votes by more than half a million. While this would not have made much of a di erence in 2008, in years in which the election is close a similar sized shift might well decide the overall outcome of the race.
To put the e ectiveness of political advertising into perspective, we note that, leading up to the general election, Obama and McCain were estimated to have spent a combined $366 million on TV ads (New York Times 2008), which implies a cost per persuaded voter of about $170. Experimental evidence from get-out-the-vote studies suggest that direct mail or high-quality commercial phone banks generate an additional vote at a cost of about $100 to $200 (see, e.g., Green and Gerber 2015) . Phone banks sta ed with volunteers or doorto-door canvasing campaigns mobilize supporters at substantially lower cost|about $30 to $50 per vote|but are inherently limited in scale. Based on these back-of-the-envelope calculations, political advertising appears to be roughly as e ective as other scalable modes of electioneering.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the impact of political advertising on electoral outcomes. Our empirical strategy exploits FCC regulations that result in plausibly exogenous variation in the number of impressions across media market borders. Using aggregate county-level data as well as individual turnout histories for millions of U.S. voters, we nd that advertising a ects elections by altering the partisan composition of the electorate. Because registered partisans are more likely to vote for their own party's candidate than his competitor, these compositional changes give rise to nontrivial e ects on actual election results.
We nd no evidence, however, that advertising has an impact on overal turnout. In the aggregate, the mobilizing and demobilizing e ects of political ads tend to cancel out. This may help to explain why a large number of previous studies have detected only minimal or even no e ects. More generally, our ndings help to explain why modern campaigns advertise so much, despite negligible changes in overall voter engagement and individuals' opinions about candidates. Even if political advertising does not have a lasting impact on preferences or beliefs, the evidence in this paper suggests that it increases the respective candidate's vote share by bringing the \right" set of voters to the polls. Given the size of our estimates, partisan imbalances in political advertising have the potential to decide close elections.
The ndings above have potentially important implications for public policy, especially for campaign-nance regulation in the post-Citizens United era. Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark decision, so-called Super PACs may accept unlimited donations from individuals, corporations, and unions in order to overtly advocate for or against particular candidates. As much of Super PACs' spending directly relates to campaign advertising, our results reinforce existing concerns about the ability of deep-pocketed donors to in uence democratic outcomes. ) as a function of the probability that a registered partisan votes for her party (π). We use the range of the Wald estimates in the lower panel of Table 9 as plausible values for Δ(t D -t R ), the impact of partisan differences in advertising on partisan differences in vote shares. The horizontal line indicates the effect size implied by the coefficient in column (9) of Table 7 . For details, see the main text. 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 11,848 Sample Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors for the first stage of the instrumental variables strategy in Section 5.3. All estimates are based on our sample of stacked border-pair counties, controlling for the full set of covariates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are two-way clustered by state and media market border, and reported in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-and 5%-levels, respectively. Entries in the upper panel are reduced from estimates for the instrumental variables strategy in Section 5.3. Entries in the lower panel are two-stage least squares estimates based on the same instrument. All estimates are based on our sample of stacked border-pair counties, controlling for yearspecific border-pair fixed effects and the full set of covariates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are two-way clustered by state and media market border, and reported in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-and 5%-levels, respectively.
Turnout
Partisan Diff. in Vote Shares Sample Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating models akin to equation (1) by ordinary least squares. The respective outcome variable is given at the top of each column, with all vote shares defined with respect to counties' entire voting-aged population. All estimates rely on our sample of stacked border-pair counties and control for year specific border-pair fixed effects. The remaining controls vary across columns. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are two-way clustered by state and media market border, and reported in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-and 5%-levels, respectively. 
Bandwidth (in meters)
Notes: Entries in the upper panel are estimates of the discontinuity in the partisan difference in turnout across media market borders, i.e., τ in equation (4). Larger values indicate an increase in turnout of registered Democrats relative to registered Republicans. The lower panel displays Wald estimates of the effect of partisan differences in political advertising on partisan differences in turnout (cf. equation (3)). All Wald estimates have been scaled so that the coefficients refer to the impact of 10 impressions per capita. As explained in the main text, the running variable is voters' distance to the nearest within-state media market border. All estimates are based on local polynomial regressions using a rectangular kernel. The order of the local polynomial is given on the left of each row, while the respective bandwidth is indicated at the top of each column. The rightmost column uses 10-fold cross-validation for bandwidth selection, with the holdout sample consisting of observations that lie within 3km of a media market border. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , we use the optimally chosen bandwidth for the outcome equation for the Wald estimator.
To account for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, every specification includes party-specific fixed effects for individual border segments of up to 10km length. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by media market border and reported in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-and 5%-levels, respectively.
A. Wald Estimates for Unaffiliated Voters
Local Polynomial 500 1,000 5,000 10-fold C-V 
Bandwidth (in meters)
Notes: Entries in the upper panel are Wald estimates of the impact of total presidential advertising on turnout among voters who are not affiliated with either of the two major parties. The lower panel displays Wald estimates of the impact of total presidential advertising on all registered voters. All estimates have been scaled so that the coefficients refer to the impact of 10 impressions per capita. As explained in the text, the running variable is voters' distance to the nearest within-state media market border. All estimates are based on local polynomial regressions using a rectangular kernel. The order of the local polynomial is given on the left of each row, while the respective bandwidth is indicated at the top of each column. The rightmost column uses 10-fold cross-validation for bandwidth selection, with the holdout sample consisting of observations that lie within 3km of a media market border. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , we use the optimally chosen bandwidth for the outcome equation of the Wald estimator. To account for unobserved spatial heterogeneity, every specification includes fixed effects for individual border segments of up to 10km length. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by media market border and reported in parentheses. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%-and 5%-levels, respectively.
